Delivering the new fighter jets to the Russian Air Forces in last decade

In the last decade, the Russian Air Forces received 567 new fighter jets, include 8 upgraded Su-27SM(3).

French vision for the MGCS - Future european Combat Vehicles destroying the Russian T-14 Armata tanks

Very interesting video, about French vision for the future battlefield. On video we can see some artist models on the French vision for the MGCS, and its action against Russian T-14 Armata MBT, which one showed twise.

 

Three different versions of MGCS:

• Canon which shows a large caliber coax which seem to can provide indirect fire.

• C² : Command and Control which seem to have a 40mm

• Missile: Same autocanon as a C², 6 missiles ready and no RCWS

The Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) project, to be implemented under German leadership, is to replace the German Leopard 2 main battle tanks and the French Leclerc main battle tanks from the mid-2030s.

T-14 Armata MBTs of opposite force.

Russian Armed Forces Receive First Two Advanced Mi-28NM Attack Helicopters

The first two serial attack helicopters of the upgraded Mi-28NM project have been handed over to the Russian Armed Forces.

"As part of the contract for serial delivery, the first two advanced Mi-28NM helicopters were recently handed over to the army aviation, the corresponding acceptance certificates were signed," the source said.

Under the current defense order Russian Helicopters will provide to the Russian Army 98 helicopters by 2027.

An upgraded version of the Mi-28N under development since 2009. The helicopter has redesigned nose hull due to removal of its nose antenna, new H025 radar station for all-round visibility, more powerful VK-2500P engines with FADEC instead of the previous Klimov TV3-117VMA engines and improved rotor blades to increase its maximum speed by 13% and cruise speed by 10%. Besides that, it has an upgraded fire-control system and new "Izdeliye 296" onboard radio-electronic data processing system. It will be equipped to carry the 9M123 Khrizantema-V and 9M127-1 Ataka-VM anti-tank missiles. It is also planned to be equipped with the new "Izdeliye 305" or LMUR (Light Multi-role Unified Missile) multi purpose missile, designed for use against air and ground targets, and fitted with inertial guidance in initial flight, with mid-course updates by an operator before the target is acquired by the missile's own seeker, giving a range of 25 km (16 mi). The Mi-28NM made its maiden flight in October 2016 and the state trials of the upgraded VK-2500P engines were completed in October 2020.

The wheeled version of combat robot "Marker" sucesfuly tested in winter condition.

The wheeled version of combat robot "Marker" sucesfuly tested in winter condition.

According to the FPI press release, the "Marker" UGV has successfully completed the trials in autonomous mode in winter conditions. It is noted that the robotic platform covered a 30-kilometer route. In the next trials, UGV will cover 50, 100 and 200 kilometer.

Russia tests direct-ascent anti-satellite missile

Russia has conducted a test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missile.

P222 Nudol interceptor Mobile TELs on MZKT-792911 chassis from the patent on the SPU design.

“Russia publicly claims it is working to prevent the transformation of outer space into a battlefield, yet at the same time Moscow continues to weaponize space by developing and fielding on-orbit and ground-based capabilities that seek to exploit U.S. reliance on space-based systems,” said U.S. Army Gen. James Dickinson, U.S. Space Command commander.

“Russia’s persistent testing of these systems demonstrates threats to U.S. and allied space systems are rapidly advancing. The establishment of U.S. Space Command as the nation’s unified combatant command for space and U.S. Space Force as the primary branch of the U.S. Armed Forces that presents space combat and combat support capabilities to U.S. Space Command could not have been timelier. We stand ready and committed to deter aggression and defend our Nation and our allies from hostile acts in space.”

The United States is concerned by Russia’s continued development and deployment of several types of ground-based and space-based ASAT weapons. These actions are contrary to Russia’s diplomatic and public stance against the weaponization of space. Specifically, Russia has demonstrated two completely different types of space weapons.

The first type of kinetic weapon is a DA-ASAT system capable of destroying satellites in low Earth orbit, which they have tested multiple times. If this weapon is tested on an actual satellite or used operationally, it will cause a large debris field that could endanger commercial satellites and irrevocably pollute the space domain.

3D-render of the SPU P222 on the MZKT-792911 chassis 

The second type is a co-orbital ASAT, a space-based weapon system, which demonstrated an on-orbit kinetic weapon in 2017 and again in 2020. Furthermore, in March 2018, President Putin announced the development of a ground-based laser system for use by the Russian Space Forces, which the Russian military acknowledged as a “combat laser system.” This pattern of behavior would be considered potentially threatening in any other domain.

“Russia has made space a warfighting domain by testing space-based and ground-based weapons intended to target and destroy satellites," Dickinson added. "This fact is inconsistent with Moscow’s public claims that Russia seeks to prevent conflict in space. Space is critical to all nations. It is a shared interest to create the conditions for a safe, stable, and operationally sustainable space environment. The demands on the space systems continue in this time of crisis where global logistics, transportation, and communications are key to defeating the COVID-19 pandemic.” 

The new russian Chemical Oxygen Iodine Air Defense Laser (COIL)

In internet leaked the picture of the secret russian laser system. On the pic we can see the direct energy weapon system, which one use the high energy Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL). Laser system is on BAZ chassis and was spotted at NPO Advent’s facility in St. Petersburg.

The laser can destroy target at 5km range and its output wavelength is 1315 nm.

 

Serbian army unveils it's new T-72B1MS White Eagle MBT

Serbian army unveils its new acquisition Russian T-72B1MS White Eagle MBT. In the official service entry ceremony of the new MBTs, attended the Aleksandar Vučić President of the Serbian Republic. Serbian Army in the ceremony univeled 11 T-72MC tanks. According the serbian sources, Russia will ship totaly 30 T-72 main battle tanks to the serbian army.

Russian aerospace forces successfully test launch new ballistic air defense missile

The 53T6M new missile of the Russian missile defense system has reliably confirmed its characteristics in a series of tests.

MOSCOW, November 26. Russia’s aerospace forces conducted another successful tests of a new anti ballistic missile of the Russian missile defense system at the Sary-Shagan firing range in Kazakhstan, the Russian defense ministry said on Thursday.

"The new anti-missile missile defense system after a series of tests has reliably confirmed the inherent characteristics, and the combat crews have successfully completed the task, hitting a conditional target with a given accuracy," said Lieutenant General Andrey Demin, commander of the 1st Army of Special Air and Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense of the Aerospace Forces.

The previous test launch of a new ballistic missile was conducted in late October on the same testing ground.

Russian Army BMPT Terminator fighting vehicles on training range

 First image of the Russian Terminators

Photo credit "Повёрнутые на войне"

Generations of the Soviet/Russian nuclear ballistic missiles

First generation from 1950 to 1960:

• R-5M Theatre Ballistic Missile (NATO reporting name SS-3 Shyster and carried the GRAU index 8K51)

• R-12 Dvina Theatre Ballistic Missile (NATO reporting name of SS-4 Sandal and carried the GRAU index 8K63)

• R-7 Semyorka ICBM (NATO reporting name of SS-6 Sapwood and carried the GRAU index 8K71)

• R-9 Desna ICBM (NATO reporting name of SS-8 Sasin and carried the GRAU index 8K75)

• R-14 Chusovaya TBM (NATO reporting name of SS-5 Skean and carried the GRAU index 8K65)

• R-16 ICBM (NATO reporting name of SS-7 Saddler and carried the GRAU index 8K64)

Second generation from 1961 to 1970:

• R-36 ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-9 Scarp Mod 1 and 2 and carried the GRAU index 8K67)

• R-36 Orb ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-9 Mod 3 Scarp and carried the GRAU index 8K69)

• R-36 RGCh ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-9 Mod 4 Scarp and carried the GRAU index 8K67P)

• RT-12 ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-13 Mod 1 Savage and carried the GRAU index 8K98)

• RT-12P ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-13 Mod 2 Savage and carried the GRAU index 8K98P)

Third generation from 1971 to 1980:

• R-36M ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-18 Mod.1,2,3 Satan and carried the GRAU index 15P014)

• MR-UR-100 Sotka ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-17 Spanker Mod 1 and 2 and carried the GRAU index 15A15)

• R-36M-UTTKh ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-18 Mod.4 Satan and carried the GRAU index 15P018)

• MR-UR-100UTTKh Sotka ICBM (NATO reporting name SS−17 Mod 3 Spanker and carried the GRAU index 15A16)

• Temp 2S ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-16 Sinner and carried the GRAU index 15Zh42)

• RSD-10 Pioneer and Pioner-2 IRBM (NATO reporting name SS-20 Mod 1 and 2 Saber and carried the GRAU index 15Zh45)

Fourth generation from 1981 to 1995:

• R-36M2 ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-18-3 Mod. 5, 6 Satan and carried the GRAU index 15P018M)

• RT-23UTTKh Molodets ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-24-1 Scalpel and carried the GRAU index 15F444)

• RT-23UTTKh Molodets ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-24-2 Scalpel and carried the GRAU index 15F444)

• RT-2PM Topol ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-25 Sickle and carried the GRAU index 15Zh58)

Fifth generation from 1996 to 2015:

• RT-2PM2 Topol-M ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-27 Sickle-B and carried the GRAU index 15Zh65)

• RS-24 Yars ICBM (NATO reporting name SS-29 or SS-27 Mod 2 and carried the GRAU index 15P155M)

Soviet/Russian Nuclear Ballistic Missiles, from left to right:

Soviet/Russian Nuclear Ballistic Missiles, from left to right:

1 - 9M76 Temp-S

2 - ICBM 15Zh42 Temp-2S

3 - MRBM 15Zh45 Pioneer

4 - MRBM 15Zh53 Pioneer UTTKh

5 - ICBM15Zh59 Courier

6 - Command missile 15Zh56 Horn

7 - MRBM 15Zh66 Speed

8 - MRBM 15ZHh57 Pioneer-3

9 - MBR 15Zh58 Topol

10 - Command missile 15Zh75 / 15Yu75 Siren

11 - ICBM 15Zh55 / 15Zh65 Topol-M

12 - ICBM 15ZH55M / 15ZH65M Yars

Armenian forces destroyed Sand Cat armored vehicle by RPG and knocked out the T-90SA by ATGM

 Armenian forces released the video, which shows the how they defeat the enemy armour.

On the footage Armenian forces destroyed Sand Cat armored vehicle by RPG and knocked out the T-90SA by ATGM

Serbia received the first two T-72B1MS MBT from Russia

Serbia received the first two T-72MS MBT from Russia. It's a gift and finaly Russia will ship totaly 30 T-72 main battle tanks to the serbian army.  

According to local media, this week two of T-72B ‘White Eagle’ MBTs was delivered to the Serbian Respublic.

T-72B1MS "White Eagle"(Ob'yekt 184-1MS):  is an T-72B1 modernized by Oboronprom company (now part of Rostec), first unveiled at International Forum Engineering Technologies 2012, painted all white, hence the unofficial nickname "White Eagle". Mechanical properties of the tank are the same as regular T-72B1, with the same engine, weapon, armor and K-1 ERA package. However, electronics are heavily upgraded, including a front and rear camera for the driver, driver digital display, GPS/GLONASS navigation system, third generation thermal panoramic sight "Eagle's Eye" for tank commander mounted at the rear left side of the turret, Sosna-U thermal gunner sight, target-tracking system, chassis management system, remotely controlled AA machine gun and more. Currently in service with Laos, Uruguay and Nicaragua armed forces, Serbia become the next user for this tank.

The first unmanned complex "Orion" of the Russian Ministry of Defense

The first unmanned complex "Orion" of the Russian Ministry of Defense (two command and control vehicles and three UAV)

The Russian Defense Ministry signed an acceptance act for the first Orion drone of Kronshtadt Company in the spring of 2020. The complex of three drones is supplied to the troops for test operation.

Orion has a normal aerodynamic scheme with a 16-meter wing in the middle and V-shaped tail fins. Maximum takeoff weight is 1200 kg. The drone and mechanisms are made of carbon plastic composite materials to decrease the glider weight. Vacuum infusion technology was introduced. The drone has an electric impulse anti-icing system for operation in low temperatures.

A piston engine is in the tail to rotate and push a two-blade propeller. APD-115T engine was designed by Itlan Company and is likely an analogue of the Austrian Rotax 914 of 115 HP used in various drones, including US heavy Predator.

AV-115 adjustable pitch propeller was designed by the Russian Aerosila Company. It is the first in the family of highly effective drone propellers.

Orion can fly 24 hours at altitudes of 7500 meters. Its communication system was designed by Luch Bureau in Rybinsk. The range is 250 km. The drone takes off and lands automatically as an airplane with three retractable wheels.

It can carry a 200-kg payload, including the multichannel MOES stabilized electronic monitoring system. It was designed by Precision Instrument-Manufacturing System Corporation to detect and track targets day and night and provide guidance for weapons.

The drone can carry a radar or a photo survey unit, as well as reconnaissance and electronic warfare means. The equipment is accommodated in a compartment un

 

6 Russian GRU officers charged in vast hacking campaign

Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace. Defendants’ Malware Attacks Caused Nearly One Billion USD in Losses to Three Victims Alone; Also Sought to Disrupt the 2017 French Elections and the 2018 Winter Olympic Games

On Oct. 15, 2020, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh returned an indictment charging six computer hackers, all of whom were residents and nationals of the Russian Federation (Russia) and officers in Unit 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. 

These GRU hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks intended to support Russian government efforts to undermine, retaliate against, or otherwise destabilize: (1) Ukraine; (2) Georgia; (3) elections in France; (4) efforts to hold Russia accountable for its use of a weapons-grade nerve agent, Novichok, on foreign soil; and (5) the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games after Russian athletes were banned from participating under their nation’s flag, as a consequence of Russian government-sponsored doping effort. 

Their computer attacks used some of the world’s most destructive malware to date, including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine; NotPetya, which caused nearly $1 billion in losses to the three victims identified in the indictment alone; and Olympic Destroyer, which disrupted thousands of computers used to support the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.  The indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy, computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and false registration of a domain name.

According to the indictment, beginning in or around November 2015 and continuing until at least in or around October 2019, the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access  to victim computers (hacking).  As alleged, the conspiracy was responsible for the following destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing computer intrusions and attacks:

• Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk;

• French Elections: April and May 2017 spearphishing campaigns and related hack-and-leak efforts targeting French President Macron’s “La République En Marche!” (En Marche!) political party, French politicians, and local French governments prior to the 2017 French elections;

• Worldwide Businesses and Critical Infrastructure (NotPetya): June 27, 2017 destructive malware attacks that infected computers worldwide using malware known as NotPetya, including hospitals and other medical facilities in the Heritage Valley Health System (Heritage Valley) in the Western District of Pennsylvania; a FedEx Corporation subsidiary, TNT Express B.V.; and a large U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer, which together suffered nearly $1 billion in losses from the attacks;

• PyeongChang Winter Olympics Hosts, Participants, Partners, and Attendees: December 2017 through February 2018 spearphishing campaigns and malicious mobile applications targeting South Korean citizens and officials, Olympic athletes, partners, and visitors, and International Olympic Committee (IOC) officials;

• PyeongChang Winter Olympics IT Systems (Olympic Destroyer): December 2017 through February 2018 intrusions into computers supporting the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, which culminated in the Feb. 9, 2018, destructive malware attack against the opening ceremony, using malware known as Olympic Destroyer;

• Novichok Poisoning Investigations: April 2018 spearphishing campaigns targeting investigations by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Kingdom’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) into the nerve agent poisoning of Sergei Skripal, his daughter, and several U.K. citizens; and

• Georgian Companies and Government Entities: a 2018 spearphishing campaign targeting a major media company, 2019 efforts to compromise the network of Parliament, and a wide-ranging website defacement campaign in 2019.

Cybersecurity researchers have tracked the Conspirators and their malicious activity using the labels “Sandworm Team,” “Telebots,” “Voodoo Bear,” and “Iron Viking.”

The charges were announced by Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers; FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich; U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania Scott W. Brady; and Special Agents in Charge of the FBI’s Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and Pittsburgh Field Offices, J.C. “Chris” Hacker, Melissa R. Godbold, and Michael A. Christman, respectively.

“No country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously or irresponsibly as Russia, wantonly causing unprecedented damage to pursue small tactical advantages and to satisfy fits of spite,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers.  “Today the department has charged these Russian officers with conducting the most disruptive and destructive series of computer attacks ever attributed to a single group, including by unleashing the NotPetya malware.  No nation will recapture greatness while behaving in this way.”

“The FBI has repeatedly warned that Russia is a highly capable cyber adversary, and the information revealed in this indictment illustrates how pervasive and destructive Russia’s cyber activities truly are,” said FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich.  “But this indictment also highlights the FBI’s capabilities.  We have the tools to investigate these malicious malware attacks, identify the perpetrators, and then impose risks and consequences on them.  As demonstrated today, we will relentlessly pursue those who threaten the United States and its citizens.”

“For more than two years we have worked tirelessly to expose these Russian GRU Officers who engaged in a global campaign of hacking, disruption and destabilization, representing the most destructive and costly cyber-attacks in history,” said U.S. Attorney Scott W. Brady for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  “The crimes committed by Russian government officials were against real victims who suffered real harm.  We have an obligation to hold accountable those who commit crimes – no matter where they reside and no matter for whom they work – in order to seek justice on behalf of these victims.” 

“The exceptional talent and dedication of our teams in Pittsburgh, Atlanta and Oklahoma City who spent years tracking these members of the GRU is unmatched,” said FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge Michael A. Christman.  “These criminals underestimated the power of shared intelligence, resources and expertise through law enforcement, private sector and international partnerships.”

The defendants, Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko (Юрий Сергеевич Андриенко), 32; Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov (Сергей Владимирович Детистов), 35; Pavel Valeryevich Frolov (Павел Валерьевич Фролов), 28; Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev (Анатолий Сергеевич Ковалев), 29; Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko (Артем Валерьевич Очиченко), 27; and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin (Петр Николаевич Плискин), 32, are all charged in seven counts: conspiracy to conduct computer fraud and abuse, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, damaging protected computers, and aggravated identity theft.  Each defendant is charged in every count.  The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, however, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The indictment accuses each defendant of committing the following overt acts in furtherance of the charged crimes:

The defendants and their co-conspirators caused damage and disruption to computer networks worldwide, including in France, Georgia, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

The NotPetya malware, for example, spread worldwide, damaged computers used in critical infrastructure, and caused enormous financial losses.  Those losses were only part of the harm, however.  For example, the NotPetya malware impaired Heritage Valley’s provision of critical medical services to citizens of the Western District of Pennsylvania through its two hospitals, 60 offices, and 18 community satellite facilities.  The attack caused the unavailability of patient lists, patient history, physical examination files, and laboratory records.  Heritage Valley lost access to its mission-critical computer systems (such as those relating to cardiology, nuclear medicine, radiology, and surgery) for approximately one week and administrative computer systems for almost one month, thereby causing a threat to public health and safety.

The conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; conspiracy to commit wire fraud carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; the two counts of wire fraud carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; intentional damage to a protected computer carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison; and the two counts of aggravated identity theft carry a mandatory sentence of two years in prison.  The indictment also alleges false registration of domain names, which would increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment for wire fraud to 27 years in prison; the maximum sentence of imprisonment for intentional damage to a protected computer to 17 years in prison; and the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for aggravated identity theft to four years in prison.  These maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress, however, and are provided here for informational purposes only, as the assigned judge will determine any sentence of a defendant.

Defendant Kovalev was previously charged in federal indictment number CR 18-215, in the District of Columbia, with conspiring to gain unauthorized access into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the administration of the 2016 U.S. elections.

Trial Attorney Heather Alpino and Deputy Chief Sean Newell of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles Eberle and Jessica Smolar of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania are prosecuting this case.  The FBI’s Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and Pittsburgh field offices conducted the investigation, with the assistance of the FBI’s Cyber Division.

The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance in this case.  The department also appreciates the significant cooperation and assistance provided by Ukrainian authorities, the Governments of the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, Georgian authorities, and the United Kingdom’s intelligence services, as well as many of the FBI’s Legal Attachés and other foreign authorities around the world.  Numerous victims cooperated and provided valuable assistance in the investigation.

The department is also grateful to Google, including its Threat Analysis Group (TAG); Cisco, including its Talos Intelligence Group; Facebook; and Twitter, for the assistance they provided in this investigation.  Some private sector companies independently disabled numerous accounts for violations of the companies’ terms of service.

Turkey's 1st live-fire test of S-400 SAM system (official video)

 Turkey's 1st live-fire test of S-400 SAM system over the Black Sea near the coastal city of Sinop.

A missile was fired into the sky on Friday on Turkey's Black Sea coast where the military was expected to test its Russian-made S-400 defence systems.

Various mission armored vehicles based on the VPK-7829 Bumerang modular wheeled platform

Various mission armored vehicles  based on the VPK-7829 Bumerang modular wheeled platform:

0 - Source vehicle

1 - IFV

2 - Mobile Gun System

3 - Air Defence System

4 - Self-Propelled Mortar

5 - Command and Control Vehicle 

6 - NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle

7 - Armoured Recovery Vehicle

8 - Armored Medical Evacuation Vehicle

9 - APC

Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms USA and Russia

Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty.  It contains data declared current as of September 1, 2020.  Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.

The data in this Fact Sheet comes from the exchange of data required by the treaty.  This data is current as of March 1, 2020

United States of America Data

Effective Date:  March 1, 2020

Via U.S. Department of State