The prototype of the Borsuk IFV teste at the Drawsko Pomorskie training area

The prototype of the Borsuk IFV at the Drawsko Pomorskie training area (Via Militarium)

The newest polish Borsuk IFV, developed for the Polish army by the Huta Stalowa Wola, last week has returned from testing at the training ground in Drawsko Pomorskie. Although it's still a prototype, it has showed well its capablites.

During the trials, they has tested the 30mm cannon of Borsuk IFV unmanned turret. Turret shows good stabilisation and accuracy. The ZSSW-30 unmanned turret of Borsuk IFV is equipet with 30mm Orbital ATK Mk 44S Bushmaster II cannon and 7,62 UKM-2000 C machine gun and Spike ATGM.

Detailed Pancerny Borsuk daje ognia na Drawsku

Drunk crew of Russian Army BMP-3 IFV punched through the wall and invade into the airport in Volgograd.

Drunk crew of Russian Army BMP-3 IFV punched through the wall and invade into the airport in Volgograd.

The incident was shooted via surveillance camera adn released on telegram of "112 channel".

Chinese next-gen MBT

Chinese next-gen MBT that is currently under development. We haven't enought information about this program. Only few screenshots from videos and some very general outlines from Chinese media. According this information NGMBT probably will by operated by two crew members and equpied with remote-controlled turret.

An experimental stand for the crew compartment of a new generation Chinese MBT. The Chinese NGMBT is likely to be operated by two crew members. To the left is the driver's seat, to the right is the gunner's/commander's seat.

Probably a dynamic stand for the chassis of a Chinese NGMBT with the seven road wheels

Screenshots from a corporate video by China NORINCO (North Vehicle Research Institute) – China's premier developer of armored vehicles. Of interest are possible glimpses of a new platform under development.

Chinese "Armored Vehicle Magazine" in 2019, presented  the likely look of PLA's NGMBT. Tank is equipped with unmanned turret and operated by two crew member.

Source - 我国第四代主战坦克设计曝光，无人炮塔，双人制车组

British Army Warfighting Experiment (2019-2020)

British Army new strategy places focus on cutting edge science and technology. Ground-breaking innovation will be at the heart of defence activity for generations, thanks to a bold new Science and Technology Strategy unveiled today by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace.

The Army Warfighting Experiment gives personnel the opportunity to test new and improved technologies for the next-generation of warfare.

The strategy was launched with Chief Scientific Adviser, Professor Dame Angela McLean, against a backdrop of futuristic autonomous military kit: from UAVs that can fit in the palm of a hand to crewless all-terrain surveillance vehicles commanded remotely from a Challenger II tank and the new AJAX vehicle demonstrating ‘human machine teaming’ with an unmanned all terrain buggy.

Building on the UK’s rich heritage in science and technology, this new strategy will focus on finding and funding the breakthroughs that will shape the future, and ensure the armed forces are equipped to meet tomorrow’s threats.

It will also have a renewed focus on data, including capture and curation, which will underpin research to identify threat trends and deliver generation-after-next military hardware.

In recent weeks, we’ve successfully demonstrated our Manned Unmanned-Teaming (MUM-T) solution using ATHENA (an AJAX Family Variant), our 6x6 MUTT Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and an optionally-tethered Unmanned Air System (UAS) on Salisbury Plain… #AWE19 @BritishAWE @dstlmod pic.twitter.com/yTBWRtpmPJ

— General Dynamics UK (@gduknews) October 20, 2020

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

We are in a very real race with our adversaries for technological advantage. What we do today will lay the groundwork for decades to come. Proliferation of new technologies demands our science and technology is threat driven and better aligned to our needs in the future.

The pair visited Salisbury Plain ahead of the Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE), which this week will showcase some of the latest British-built military technologies.

Professor Dame Angela McLean said:

We need a clear focus on what we want science and technology to achieve. I will champion a challenge-led approach, based on trends across science, technology and the military, to set out what we need to be able to do in the future and how we can build towards it through our S&T activity.

Minister for Science Research and Innovation Amanda Solloway said:

Placing science and research at the heart of the UK’s defence activity will unleash a new wave of innovation for our brilliant armed forces, equipping them to meet our greatest challenges. By backing our best and brightest scientific minds in every corner of the UK, we will ensure we bolster the security of our nation now and for decades to come.

The Army Warfighting Experiment series allows the British Army to push the boundaries of technology and military technology, testing a range of prototype systems by putting them in the hands of the user while giving invaluable feedback to suppliers. This is all done to ensure that British troops maintain a continuous advantage over adversaries on the battlefield of today and tomorrow.

This complements the ongoing Integrated Review of foreign, defence, development and security policy. The Strategy & Technology will also be central to the government’s ambition for the UK to cement its status as a world leading science superpower, set out in its ambitious Research & Development Roadmap in July this year.

The latest strategy launch comes weeks after the MoD rolled out a new integrated operational concept to shape how Britain adapts its future military effort to the changing security threat posed by the likes of China and Russia.

Future military development would focus on five emerging technology areas that have posed the most significant enduring capability challenge, according to the new S&T strategy document. Technology areas listed are:

• Pervasive, full-spectrum, multidomain intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Multidomain command and control, communications, and computers.

• Improvement of the U.K.’s ability to compete against adversaries below the threshold of conventional conflict while addressing vulnerabilities, especially in the information environment.

• Develop systems to target adversaries in new ways across all domains.

• Generate affordable, survivable capabilities that can rapidly address evolving threats and can operate within a denied electromagnetic environment.

• “They have been recognized as the key drivers for science and technology and research and development within the MoD," the document read. "The Department will continue to have an enduring requirement to maintain investment in science and technology capabilities and programs beyond these.”

Via GOV.UK

Photo credit Defence Photography

6 Russian GRU officers charged in vast hacking campaign

Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace. Defendants’ Malware Attacks Caused Nearly One Billion USD in Losses to Three Victims Alone; Also Sought to Disrupt the 2017 French Elections and the 2018 Winter Olympic Games

On Oct. 15, 2020, a federal grand jury in Pittsburgh returned an indictment charging six computer hackers, all of whom were residents and nationals of the Russian Federation (Russia) and officers in Unit 74455 of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), a military intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. 

These GRU hackers and their co-conspirators engaged in computer intrusions and attacks intended to support Russian government efforts to undermine, retaliate against, or otherwise destabilize: (1) Ukraine; (2) Georgia; (3) elections in France; (4) efforts to hold Russia accountable for its use of a weapons-grade nerve agent, Novichok, on foreign soil; and (5) the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games after Russian athletes were banned from participating under their nation’s flag, as a consequence of Russian government-sponsored doping effort. 

Their computer attacks used some of the world’s most destructive malware to date, including: KillDisk and Industroyer, which each caused blackouts in Ukraine; NotPetya, which caused nearly $1 billion in losses to the three victims identified in the indictment alone; and Olympic Destroyer, which disrupted thousands of computers used to support the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.  The indictment charges the defendants with conspiracy, computer hacking, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and false registration of a domain name.

According to the indictment, beginning in or around November 2015 and continuing until at least in or around October 2019, the defendants and their co-conspirators deployed destructive malware and took other disruptive actions, for the strategic benefit of Russia, through unauthorized access  to victim computers (hacking).  As alleged, the conspiracy was responsible for the following destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing computer intrusions and attacks:

• Ukrainian Government & Critical Infrastructure: December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service, using malware known as BlackEnergy, Industroyer, and KillDisk;

• French Elections: April and May 2017 spearphishing campaigns and related hack-and-leak efforts targeting French President Macron’s “La République En Marche!” (En Marche!) political party, French politicians, and local French governments prior to the 2017 French elections;

• Worldwide Businesses and Critical Infrastructure (NotPetya): June 27, 2017 destructive malware attacks that infected computers worldwide using malware known as NotPetya, including hospitals and other medical facilities in the Heritage Valley Health System (Heritage Valley) in the Western District of Pennsylvania; a FedEx Corporation subsidiary, TNT Express B.V.; and a large U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturer, which together suffered nearly $1 billion in losses from the attacks;

• PyeongChang Winter Olympics Hosts, Participants, Partners, and Attendees: December 2017 through February 2018 spearphishing campaigns and malicious mobile applications targeting South Korean citizens and officials, Olympic athletes, partners, and visitors, and International Olympic Committee (IOC) officials;

• PyeongChang Winter Olympics IT Systems (Olympic Destroyer): December 2017 through February 2018 intrusions into computers supporting the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, which culminated in the Feb. 9, 2018, destructive malware attack against the opening ceremony, using malware known as Olympic Destroyer;

• Novichok Poisoning Investigations: April 2018 spearphishing campaigns targeting investigations by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Kingdom’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) into the nerve agent poisoning of Sergei Skripal, his daughter, and several U.K. citizens; and

• Georgian Companies and Government Entities: a 2018 spearphishing campaign targeting a major media company, 2019 efforts to compromise the network of Parliament, and a wide-ranging website defacement campaign in 2019.

Cybersecurity researchers have tracked the Conspirators and their malicious activity using the labels “Sandworm Team,” “Telebots,” “Voodoo Bear,” and “Iron Viking.”

The charges were announced by Assistant Attorney General John C. Demers; FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich; U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania Scott W. Brady; and Special Agents in Charge of the FBI’s Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and Pittsburgh Field Offices, J.C. “Chris” Hacker, Melissa R. Godbold, and Michael A. Christman, respectively.

“No country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously or irresponsibly as Russia, wantonly causing unprecedented damage to pursue small tactical advantages and to satisfy fits of spite,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers.  “Today the department has charged these Russian officers with conducting the most disruptive and destructive series of computer attacks ever attributed to a single group, including by unleashing the NotPetya malware.  No nation will recapture greatness while behaving in this way.”

“The FBI has repeatedly warned that Russia is a highly capable cyber adversary, and the information revealed in this indictment illustrates how pervasive and destructive Russia’s cyber activities truly are,” said FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich.  “But this indictment also highlights the FBI’s capabilities.  We have the tools to investigate these malicious malware attacks, identify the perpetrators, and then impose risks and consequences on them.  As demonstrated today, we will relentlessly pursue those who threaten the United States and its citizens.”

“For more than two years we have worked tirelessly to expose these Russian GRU Officers who engaged in a global campaign of hacking, disruption and destabilization, representing the most destructive and costly cyber-attacks in history,” said U.S. Attorney Scott W. Brady for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  “The crimes committed by Russian government officials were against real victims who suffered real harm.  We have an obligation to hold accountable those who commit crimes – no matter where they reside and no matter for whom they work – in order to seek justice on behalf of these victims.” 

“The exceptional talent and dedication of our teams in Pittsburgh, Atlanta and Oklahoma City who spent years tracking these members of the GRU is unmatched,” said FBI Pittsburgh Special Agent in Charge Michael A. Christman.  “These criminals underestimated the power of shared intelligence, resources and expertise through law enforcement, private sector and international partnerships.”

The defendants, Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko (Юрий Сергеевич Андриенко), 32; Sergey Vladimirovich Detistov (Сергей Владимирович Детистов), 35; Pavel Valeryevich Frolov (Павел Валерьевич Фролов), 28; Anatoliy Sergeyevich Kovalev (Анатолий Сергеевич Ковалев), 29; Artem Valeryevich Ochichenko (Артем Валерьевич Очиченко), 27; and Petr Nikolayevich Pliskin (Петр Николаевич Плискин), 32, are all charged in seven counts: conspiracy to conduct computer fraud and abuse, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, damaging protected computers, and aggravated identity theft.  Each defendant is charged in every count.  The charges contained in the indictment are merely accusations, however, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The indictment accuses each defendant of committing the following overt acts in furtherance of the charged crimes:

The defendants and their co-conspirators caused damage and disruption to computer networks worldwide, including in France, Georgia, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

The NotPetya malware, for example, spread worldwide, damaged computers used in critical infrastructure, and caused enormous financial losses.  Those losses were only part of the harm, however.  For example, the NotPetya malware impaired Heritage Valley’s provision of critical medical services to citizens of the Western District of Pennsylvania through its two hospitals, 60 offices, and 18 community satellite facilities.  The attack caused the unavailability of patient lists, patient history, physical examination files, and laboratory records.  Heritage Valley lost access to its mission-critical computer systems (such as those relating to cardiology, nuclear medicine, radiology, and surgery) for approximately one week and administrative computer systems for almost one month, thereby causing a threat to public health and safety.

The conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; conspiracy to commit wire fraud carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; the two counts of wire fraud carry a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; intentional damage to a protected computer carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison; and the two counts of aggravated identity theft carry a mandatory sentence of two years in prison.  The indictment also alleges false registration of domain names, which would increase the maximum sentence of imprisonment for wire fraud to 27 years in prison; the maximum sentence of imprisonment for intentional damage to a protected computer to 17 years in prison; and the mandatory sentence of imprisonment for aggravated identity theft to four years in prison.  These maximum potential sentences are prescribed by Congress, however, and are provided here for informational purposes only, as the assigned judge will determine any sentence of a defendant.

Defendant Kovalev was previously charged in federal indictment number CR 18-215, in the District of Columbia, with conspiring to gain unauthorized access into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the administration of the 2016 U.S. elections.

Trial Attorney Heather Alpino and Deputy Chief Sean Newell of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles Eberle and Jessica Smolar of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania are prosecuting this case.  The FBI’s Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and Pittsburgh field offices conducted the investigation, with the assistance of the FBI’s Cyber Division.

The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided critical assistance in this case.  The department also appreciates the significant cooperation and assistance provided by Ukrainian authorities, the Governments of the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, Georgian authorities, and the United Kingdom’s intelligence services, as well as many of the FBI’s Legal Attachés and other foreign authorities around the world.  Numerous victims cooperated and provided valuable assistance in the investigation.

The department is also grateful to Google, including its Threat Analysis Group (TAG); Cisco, including its Talos Intelligence Group; Facebook; and Twitter, for the assistance they provided in this investigation.  Some private sector companies independently disabled numerous accounts for violations of the companies’ terms of service.

Unveiled the new Iveco DV Super AV LAND armored vehicle

The new Iveco DV SUPERAV LAND armored vehicle, a non-amphibious variant of the 8x8 SuperAV / ACV winner of the USMC competition (and future VBA, Amphibious Armored Vehicle, of the Italian Armed forces) was unveiled, presenting it to the personnel of the Armed Forces of Qatar.

The Qatari personnel are in Italy, at the Torre Veneri (LE) polygon, to participate in a joint exercise with the EI. In addition to the SUPERAV LAND, Qatar is interested in the SUPERAV / ACV, to equip its amphibious component based on the LPD supplied by Fincantieri as part of the naval program, and in the heavy duty CENTAURO 2. Details and insights on RID 11/20.

Secret Soft-Kill system (jammer) of Israel Merkava Mk-III MBT

 The IDF experiment in southern Lebanon has been exposed

In the northernmost IDF outpost in the security zone in southern Lebanon sat a “surge company”. A secret armored company, which every soldier who served in the outpost knew that its tanks should not be touched. Of course they did not know the reason – these are tanks with a “purple thunder” (רעם סגול) system. Because of anti-tank missiles that were still in development.

Twenty years after the company was disbanded, the full story of the experiment conducted in real conditions, against an enemy, in southern Lebanon, was allowed to be published. Even today the fighters who served in the company are not sure if it was a successful experiment or a failure.

Hermon David was a young and poisoned officer in a surge company 22 years ago. “We were a very secret company,” he said for the first time about the experiences in the experiment. “We were regularly stationed at the basin outpost, the hottest, most complicated and most threatened place – at the end of the security strip. All the time we had to cover the tanks and equipment and hide our mission.”

At that time, many armored companies operated and fought in the security zone, but unlike the other companies, surge fighters served continuously in southern Lebanon. “We were stationed in the hottest sector in Lebanon, the basin post, which abducted many fighter fighters in those years. Beyond trying to test the system we also had a lot of active successes. Our force was very skilled, with combat experience on the ground, constantly doing the same thing – Lebanon.”

“Our goal was to be in the most dangerous and problematic place all the time, to check the functioning of the system when Hezbollah fires a missile at us,” described David, who served as the company’s deputy commander. “I mean, if the system works it’s fine, but if the system doesn’t work it’s not good.”

Ari Brock, who served as a tank commander, added: “We made a lot of trips in daylight and in front of controlled areas, especially in combat incidents. The intention was to fire a missile at us, who just fired. We were pretty prepared for that, even in coverings. You are less afraid of being exposed in daylight See what happens when a missile is fired at you. “

“On our first two lines in Lebanon they let us play. We would do new things, travel to distant territories. One day we stood in daylight on a spur and waited for a missile. A missile arrived that exploded near the tank caterpillar, but nothing happened to us and the system was not activated,” Brock said. Immediately afterwards he explains that the mission was not to just stand still, but was an operational need “my team also took down two terrorists”.

Despite the shroud of secrecy and full adherence to field security practices, the secret story that ran in southern Lebanon about the special tank company from the Reihan outpost rolled to the ears of the young armored personnel of the time. The stories were about a company with a secret system that eliminates dozens of terrorists and initiates daring operations.

“We did a unique activity from the very activity that was carried out,” said the company’s last commander, Omri Miron. “We changed the concept of the activity a bit – from ambushes of infantry and tanks to skipping ambushes of two pairs of tanks – at unconventional hours and not throughout the night. I felt safe thanks to the people who were with me, and thanks to the professionalism and seriousness we demonstrated in the preparations we made for everything. ”

But throughout the service in southern Lebanon the fighters knew they were putting themselves in danger. “There were situations we knew about missile squads that were about to fire so we stood really exposed. We relied on the system. Lee, as a tank commander, had the knowledge that if we were fired at a missile then ‘purple thunder’ would disrupt it,” Brock said.

“My desire was to immigrate to Lebanon and be in a special place – and I got what I wanted,” added Roi Ofer, who was also a tank commander in the company. “I realized that I was part of an experiment and that the military was testing the effectiveness of the system, but I do not think we felt in the experiment. The goal as we understood it is that we are here to be shot at.”

Ofer expanded: “Feelings change all the time. On the one hand you are on the front of the front, and you are on a tank that does not look normal and you are there to hijack missiles, to test the system. On the other hand, no one wants to be in this situation. Maybe we were kind Of ‘Trial Rabbit’, but that was the only way to test it. “

Colonel Reli Margalit is now recognized as the one who postponed the release to head the Home Front Command epidemiological investigation system. In those years he commanded a surge company. “It was a very special company, built with the idea of ​​an operational experiment in a defensive concept that allows for something more offensive and at no point was there a sense of a guinea pig.”

“We thought it was right and appropriate, and we were also part of the development. We had a lot of other experiments that we were partners in and we saw that they worked,” he added. “Our feeling was that we were saving the country.”

“I do not think we were an experimental rabbit,” Brock also supported. “The truth is that we were never fired upon by a direct-launch missile, so I can not say that the system was successfully tested. We relied on the system.”

After the withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, the military experiment in “purple thunder” was stopped and the special company was disbanded. Throughout the years it operated in the security zone, the company’s tanks were subjected to many mortar stresses and almost all types of fire, except for anti-tank missiles, which the special system was built to protect against.

“Factually, at that time no missiles were fired at us as we expected it to happen,” said Col. Margalit.

– Sucks?

“A bit. There is a very big paradox here. I certainly miss that period, for the fighters there it was a period of self-fulfillment. We were in an experience that is very, very significant and fascinating in Lebanon. We developed all kinds of different techniques and all kinds of norms that were not customary in the security zone. “Somewhat bolder actions, but it was more because of our professionalism.”

The disappointment that the system was not tested in real time is felt by all the fighters we spoke to. “Everyone in our company wanted to see if the system worked or not,” Ofer said. “Everyone in the battle wants to come across, they will shoot at you and put them in. On the other hand, you terribly want not to, and it’s scary murder. These are feelings that come together. There were very scary moments. On the tank. “

More than twenty years after the company’s activity ended, the fighters are trying to explain how they agreed to put themselves in the situation. “You could call it a soldier’s youthful stupidity,” Brock said. “Today it would not have happened, but as a 20-year-old you are sure it will work.”

“It may not be true to say, but I have a kind of regret that the system was not tested under fire,” David said. “It’s a paradox because you seem to have to save your life and your ambition is that they will not fire missiles at you, and if they do shoot they will not hit. But as a fighter with a mission and a goal – I felt a kind of miss.”

After the withdrawal from Lebanon, the then commander of the Northern Command, Gabi Ashkenazi, awarded the company a troop following the activities of its fighters in the months before and during the withdrawal.

The defense establishment responded: The ‘Purple Thunder’ system is an active defense system developed by Mapat, Elta and IMI. After proving the system’s performance in a series of live experiments, the land arm decided to set up the company for an operational examination of the system. After completing the operational examination, and with the departure of the IDF from Lebanon, the ground arm decided to dismantle the systems and transfer them to storage.

The “Purple Thunder” system formed the basis for the capabilities and systems that exist today and placed Israel at the forefront of global technology in dealing with the threat of anti-tank missiles. It should be emphasized that from the outset the company’s SDK was in addition to the existing operational SDK of the IDF Armored Brigades, so that its closure did not affect the SDK of the operational forces required to meet IDF missions.

“As for the claim that the systems experiment led to risk-taking, it will be clarified that the company operated under the same procedures and orders of all the armored companies that operated in the security strip and therefore there was no change in the way it operated in relation to other armored companies.”

Elta and Elbit (the current owners of IMI) declined to comment on the experiment.

Via News1